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Abstract 
Based on the idea that intentions have different penetrability to perception and 
thought (Fodor, 1983), four Stroop-like tasks, AA, AW, WA, and WW are used, 
where the A represents an arrow and the CPPR (closest processing prior to response) 
is perception, and the W represents a word and the CPPR is thought. Event-related 
brain potentials were recorded as participants completed these tasks, and sLORETA 
(standardized low resolution brain electromagnetic tomography) was used to localize 
the sources at specific time points. These results showed that there is an interference 
effect in the AA and WA tasks, but not in the AW or WW tasks. The activated brain 
areas related to the interference effect in the AA task were the PFC and ACC, and 
PFC activation took place prior to ACC activation; but only PFC in WA task. 
Combined with previous results, a new neural mechanism of cognitive control is 
proposed.  
 
 
 
Key Words: cognitive control, anterior cingulate cortex, prefrontal cortex, closest 
processing prior to response, sLORETA 
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Introduction 
The neural basis of cognitive control is thought to be a neural network 
consisting of different brain areas1, within which the ACC (anterior cingulate cortex) 
and PFC (prefrontal cortex) are often identified to be activated in conflict occurrence 
and/or control tasks. However, the special role of each area and the interaction 
between them in cognitive control is a subject of intense controversy among 
investigators. The two major theories developed to interpret the neural mechanism of 
cognitive control are the regulative view and the monitoring view2. Researchers who 
hold the regulative view believe that the PFC plays a monitoring role in conflict 
occurrence and the ACC implements control during conflict2-5. In contrast, researchers 
who hold the monitoring view propose that the ACC monitors the occurrence of 
conflict and the PFC carries out the control6-9. It is reasonable that cognitive control 
consists of two aspects: monitoring and control, otherwise the “homunculus” question 
is difficult to answer3,10. In fact, this viewpoint is accepted by both of the above 
theories, with the main difference being which structure executes the monitoring role 
and which executes the control role. However, what makes the problem more 
complex is that some studies have found just one structure, either the ACC or PFC, to 
be solely responsible for cognitive control11,12. 
According to the theories reviewed above, cognitive control is possible either 
through cooperation between the ACC and PFC, or through the activation of just one 
of these structures. Such a complex situation may stem from the use of different tasks 
in which the mental components and corresponding neural activities are different3. In 
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a typical cognitive control task, the target and the distracter each elicit a particular 
response. When two responses are incongruent, the incongruent response elicited by 
the distracter would need to be controlled in order to execute the task-relevant 
response. It is thus clear that cognitive control takes place between competitive 
responses, and response conflict has been the focus of previous studies. Recent studies 
have proposed that different levels of conflict processing can take place before a 
response13-20. These studies imply that the process before a response may play an 
important role in cognitive control.  
A distracter that causes non-response-level conflict either does not elicit a 
behavioral response15-19or elicits the same response as the target13,14,17. However, 
non-response conflict studies demonstrate that there are several processing stages 
before a response21, and more importantly, that the same response can take place on 
different information processing levels. For example, in the Stroop task, the response 
to the color of a color word is behaviorally similar to that of the meaning of the color 
word, but the processes prior to the two responses are obviously different22. Types of 
responses frequently used in previous studies include vocal23, manual2, and saccade24, 
with the two conflicting responses generally sharing the same manner of response 
within the task. Since the overt behavioral responses to the target and distracter have 
the same manner of response, the difference between incongruent and congruent 
conditions should stem mainly from the processes prior to the response. Although 
there may be several processing stages prior to a response21, we assume that the 
closest processing prior to a response (CPPR) may be the critical stage in which to 
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understand conflict between responses. 
After carefully analyzing the characteristics of major paradigms in cognitive 
control studies, we propose that the CPPR could be differentiated into two levels: 
perception and thought. For example, the CPPR in response to an arrow in the Eriksen 
flanker task may be perception, while the CPPR in response to a word in the Stroop 
task may be a thought. More concretely, when a participant executes a response 
according to an arrow, there is no semantic or phonemic processing; the response can 
be executed only after completing the perceptual processing of the arrow shape, since 
the information instructing the response is contained within the shape of the arrow. 
Therefore, the CPPR in response to the arrow could be regarded as perception 
processing. On the other hand, when a participant executes a response according to a 
word, it is necessary to complete further semantic or phonemic processing, because 
information is contained within the meaning of the word. The semantic or phonemic 
processing may involve some higher cognitive performance, such as working memory 
or representation maintenance; therefore, the CPPR in response to the word could be 
regarded as thought processing. In the opinion of Fodor (1983), perceptual processing 
is encapsulated and not affected by intention, but thought processing is open, slow, 
and easily affected by internal intention25,26. Apparently, due to differences in the 
intentional control of different types of conflict, the CPPRs of perception and thought 
would be different, as would the related neural activity. 
Based on the above analysis, we may use the Stroop-like arrow word task27 to 
detect the effects of CPPR on cognitive control. In such a task, the CPPR in response 
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to the arrow is on the level of perceptual processing, but the CPPR in response to the 
word is on the level of thought processing. Both the target and distracter in this task 
can be either an arrow or a word. Therefore, four experimental tasks can be 
established: an arrow-arrow task (AA), where arrows are targets and distracters; an 
arrow-word task (AW), where arrows are targets and words are distracters; a 
word-arrow task (WA), where words are targets and arrows are distracters; and a 
word-word task (WW), where words are targets and distracters. The contrasts of 
CPPR in these four tasks are perception vs. perception in AA, thought vs. thought in 
WW, thought vs. perception in WA, and perception vs. thought in AW. In the present 
study, participants were asked to manually respond to stimuli with a left or right 
button press according to what the target indicated. Because the peripheral nerve 
pathways of the left and right button press are dissociated, conflict and control take 
place within the central nervous system28. We hope to investigate the effect of CPPR 
on behavioral performance and corresponding neural activities in a Stroop-like arrow 
word task.  
In numerous previous studies, event-related brain potentials (ERPs) have been 
used to explore the neural basis of cognitive control. Because of the high temporal 
resolution of this technique, it is possible to trace the neural dynamics of cognitive 
control. Several ERP components have been associated with cognitive control, such as 
the ERN29, MFN30, N217, P331, and N45019. In addition, a source analysis of the 
difference wave—the substraction of a congruent ERP wave from an incongruent 
one—can provide stable neural source results of cognitive control3,17. In the present 
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study, we searched for ERP components which showed a significant difference 
between congruent and incongruent conditions, and conducted a source analysis to 
understand the neural mechanism of cognitive control.  
 
Material and Methods 
Participants  
Sixteen young people (10 men; mean age = 22.5 years; SD = 2.3) 
participated in the experiment as paid volunteers. Some trials must be excluded from 
off-line data analysis because of incorrect responses and ocular and other artifacts. 
There were 80 trials in each condition for each task. If more than 20 trials per 
condition were excluded from a participant, that participant’s data for that task were 
excluded from grand averaging. All participants were healthy, right-handed, and had 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Prior to the test, participants gave written 
informed consent in accordance with the Human Subjects Institutional Review Board 
of Southwest University. After completing the test, each participant received a 
monetary payment for his/her participation. 
Stimuli and Psychological Task  
------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Figure 1 in about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Participants were seated comfortably and tested in a sound-attenuating and 
light-subduing room. In each trial, a stimulus combination was presented at the center 
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of the CRT (Cathode Ray Tube) display. All possible combinations of arrows and 
words indicating left or right (in Chinese) were presented (Figure 1). The participant 
sat approximately 0.5 m away from the display, and the stimulus combination was 
subtended a 0.6° visual angle vertically and 0.6°-3.2° visual angle horizontally. 
Participants indicated by a left or right button press the direction denoted by the target 
stimulus, either an arrow or word, depending on the task. Participants were instructed 
to respond as quickly as possible while trying to avoid errors. Button presses were 
made using the index finger of each hand: the left index finger corresponded to a 
left-pointing target and the right corresponded to a right-pointing target.  
The present study consisted of four tasks: AA, AW, WA, and WW (Figure 1). 
On incongruent trials, the target and distracter indicated opposite responses, yielding 
response conflict. On congruent trials, the target and distracter indicated the same 
response, yielding no response conflict. Congruent or incongruent stimulus 
combinations were presented rapidly, in a randomly intermixed order to prevent 
subjects from anticipating and changing strategies for the different event types. Trials 
were blocked by task and position of the target (either above or below the central 
point). Because there were four tasks, there were 8 blocks of 100 trials each. In each 
block, the first 20 trials were for practice and the latter 80 trials formed the formal 
experiment. First, a fixation cross was presented in the center of the screen for 500 ms. 
Next, a blank screen was displayed for a random interval of 500-1500 ms. Finally, the 
stimulus combination was presented at the center of screen, and the participant was 
asked to press a button according to the direction denoted by the target. The stimulus 
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combination was terminated by button-press or 2000 ms post-stimulus.  
Data Acquisition  
Electroencephalography (EEG) was conducted with a 
64-channel (Brain Product, Munich, Germany) recording system with the left mastoid 
as the reference, and re-referenced to average mastoid off-line. The electrooculogram 
(EOG) was recorded with electrodes placed above and below the left eye. All 
interelectrode impedance was maintained below 5 kΩ during recording. The EEG and 
EOG were continuously sampled at 500 Hz with DC-100 Hz bandpass and 50 Hz 
notch on. Trials contaminated with EOG artifacts (mean EOG voltage exceeding ±80 
μV) or those with artifacts due to amplifier clipping, bursts of electromyographic 
(EMG) activity, or peak-to-peak deflection exceeding ±100 μV were excluded from 
averaging. 
Data Analysis 
 ERP waveforms were time-locked to the onset of the 
stimulus. The averaged epoch for ERPs was 800 ms including a 200 ms baseline. The 
following 20 sites were chosen for statistical analysis: F3, F1, Fz, F2, F4, FC3, FC1, 
FCz, FC2, FC4, C3, C1, Cz, C2, C4, CP3, CP1, CPz, CP2, and CP4. For the AA task, 
the N2 amplitude peak was measured in the 200-250 ms time window, and the mean 
amplitude was measured in the 270-370 ms time window. For the WA task, the mean 
amplitude was measured in the 270-350 ms time window, and the peak amplitude and 
latency of the P3 were measured in the 330-410 ms time window. The amplitudes and 
latencies in the two tasks were analyzed using two-way repeated measures analysis of 
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variance (ANOVA) with factors of condition (congruent and incongruent) and 
electrode site (20 sites). The p-values of all main and interaction effects were 
corrected using the Greenhouse-Geisser method for repeated-measures effects.  
Because the actual sources are unlikely to be a single source32, we used 
sLORETA (standardized low resolution brain electromagnetic tomography)33-35 to 
generate equivalent distributed sources of the neural activity from the difference wave, 
incongruent minus congruent. By dividing the brain volume into a lattice of voxels 
and allocating a dipolar source to each voxel, sLORETA estimates the distributed 
dipole strengths (current density) across the brain volume while maximizing 
“smoothness”. The local maxima of the distributed dipole strengths are assumed to 
reflect active sources36 with Z values >3.09 (p < 0.001). The head model was based on 
the discrete Montréal Neurological Insitute (MNI) brain model of 5-mm resolution 
(MNI152 template), which consists of voxels unambiguously labeled as cortical grey 
matter with a final voxel number of 6239. The forward electric potential lead field for 
the inverse solution was generated by a boundary element method. MNI coordinates 
were transformed into Talairach coordinates. Details regarding sLORETA, including 
the software package used, are available at 
http://www.unizh.ch/keyinst/NewLORETA/LORETA01.htm. 
 
Results 
Behavioral Performance  
The reaction times (RTs) and error rates in each condition and the statistical 
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results of paired-samples t-tests between incongruent and congruent conditions in 
each task are presented in Table 1 and Figure 2. The statistical results showed that, in 
both AA and WA tasks, the responses to incongruent trials were significantly slower 
than on congruent trials. Meanwhile, the error rates on incongruent trials were 
significantly higher than on congruent trials. Based on these results, it could be 
suggested that the distracter on incongruent trials in the AA and WA tasks caused 
interference. However, in the AW and WW task, the RTs and error rates were not 
significantly different between incongruent and congruent conditions, suggesting 
there was no interference effect. 
------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Table 1 and Figure 2 in about here 
------------------------------------------ 
ERP Results 
After excluding data for excessive incorrect responses or artifacts, 13 
participants in the AA task, 12 in the AW task, 14 in the WA task, and 14 in the WW 
task were used for grand averaging. For the WA and AA tasks, in which significant 
interference effects appeared in the behavioral data (Table 1), the grand ERP 
waveforms in incongruent and congruent conditions and their difference wave are 
presented in Figure 3. In the AA task, the difference wave between the two conditions 
was manifested mainly in the 270 to 350 ms time window. A distinct difference was 
apparent after the N2, and the peak of the difference wave was at about 330 ms. In the 
WA task, the difference was delayed; it took place mainly in the 340 to 410 ms time 
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window, and the peak of the difference waveform was at about 370 ms. For both the 
AA and WA tasks, the amplitudes of congruent trials were larger than those of 
incongruent trials in the corresponding time windows. 
------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Figure 3 in about here 
------------------------------------------ 
In the AA task, the mean amplitude in the 270-370 ms time window was 
4.682 ± 1.334 μV (M ± SE) on incongruent and 5.779 ± 1.295 μV on congruent trials. 
Repeated-measures ANOVAs showed that there was a significant main effect of 
condition, F(1, 12) = 10.274, p = 0.008, and a significant main effect of electrode sites, 
F(19, 228) = 3.319, p = 0.046, but the interaction was not significant, F(19, 228) = 
1.759, p = 0.157.  
In the WA task, the peak amplitude in the 330-410 ms time window was 
6.643 ± 1.369 μV on incongruent and 8.633 ± 1.51 μV on congruent trials. There were 
significant main effects of condition, F(1, 13) = 14.909, p = 0.002, and electrode sites, 
F(19, 247) = 4.699, p = 0.013, as well as a significant interaction, F(19, 247) = 3.58, p 
= 0.018. The peak latency of P3 in the 330-410 ms time window was 372 ± 3.8 ms on 
incongruent and 371 ± 4.6 ms on congruent trials. There was no significant difference, 
F(1, 13) = 0.001, p = 0.988. The results of the N2 amplitude peak comparison showed 
that there was no significant effect of condition in the AA or WA task in the N2 time 
window, F(1, 12) = 0.148, p = 0.707 and F(1, 13) = 2.075, p = 0.173, respectively. 
 
N
at
ur
e 
Pr
ec
ed
in
gs
 : 
hd
l:1
01
01
/n
pr
e.
20
07
.1
26
9.
1 
: P
os
te
d 
28
 O
ct
 2
00
7
 12
------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Figure 4 in about here 
------------------------------------------ 
As shown in Figure 4, the waveforms elicited by incongruent and congruent 
conditions in the AW and WW tasks nearly overlapped during the entire epoch, which 
suggested that there was no significant difference between the two conditions. Based 
on the above results (Table 1 and Figures 3-4), it is possible that the distracter in 
incongruent trials caused an interference effect on ERPs and behavior in the AA and 
WA tasks, which was not seen in the AW and WW tasks. 
------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Figure 5 in about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Although the temporal window of the difference can be acquired from the ERP 
waveforms (Figures 3-4), and the spatial distribution can be acquired from the 
topographies, the information is not sufficiently detailed. Based on a separation of the 
significance levels, the p-values of significance from single-sampled t-tests against 
zero were drawn as images (Figure 5); accordingly, the subtler temporal and spatial 
distributions of the difference were obtained. According to Figure 5, the distribution 
of the difference between congruent and incongruent trials was different between the 
AA and WA tasks temporally and spatially. Considering that the CPPRs are related 
components, the difference in AA begins at about 270 ms, the significance level of the 
early difference is lower (0.01 ≤ p < 0.05), and the distribution is partial on the 
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selected electrodes. In contrast, the difference in the WA task begins at about 330 ms, 
the significance level of the early difference is higher (0.001 ≤ p < 0.01), and the 
distribution is more orderly on almost all selected electrodes. Furthermore, the higher 
significance level (0.001 ≤ p < 0.01) in AA suggests that the distribution time window 
is more narrow than that in WA and there are fewer involved electrodes. The pattern 
of highly significant difference (p < 0.001) in AA showed middle and left 
lateralization, but that in WA showed mainly right lateralization. 
Three-dimensional current source imaging  
Initially, the cortex current density of the difference waves in the AA and WA 
tasks was estimated using BESA (brain electrical source analysis) software (version 
5.0; Figure 6). As shown in Figure 6, for the AA task, there were two activated areas 
in the right frontal and centro-frontal cortex at about 270 ms; but after 290 ms, the 
activation focused stably in the centro-frontal cortex. For the WA task, activation was 
maintained in the right centro-frontal cortex from 330 to 410 ms.  
------------------------------------------ 
Please insert Figure 6, Figure 7, and Table 2 in about here 
------------------------------------------ 
Three-dimensional current source density maps were estimated using 
sLORETA. Based on the previous waveform analysis, the difference wave of the AA 
task was analyzed at 270 ms, 290 ms, 310 ms, 330 ms, 350 ms, and 370 ms and the 
results were projected on magnetic resonance image maps of the brain (Figure 7). The 
Talairach coordinates and corresponding names of central positions in the activated 
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areas for each selected time point are included in Table 2. Using the same procedure, 
the difference wave in the WA task was analyzed at the following time points: 340 ms, 
350 ms, 360 ms, 370 ms, 380 ms, and 390 ms (Table 2 and Figure 7). 
For the difference wave in the AA task, the lateral PFC, medial PFC, ACC, 
and superior parietal cortex (SPC) were consecutively activated from 270 to 370 ms. 
It is clear that the medial PFC and right lateral PFC were simultaneously activated at 
270 ms, but at the peak difference time point of 330 ms, the main activation was in 
the dorsal ACC. Later, at 370 ms, the dorsal ACC and SPC were simultaneously 
activated. In the WA task, the medial PFC was activated at 340 ms, followed by the 
right lateral PFC and SPC; no ACC activation was detected. 
 
Discussion 
According to behavioral, ERP, and source imaging results, the manipulation 
of CPPR has a significant effect in the AA and WA tasks, but no effect in the AW and 
WW tasks. These findings suggest that when the distracter is a word—regardless of 
whether the target is an arrow or word—the interference effect does not appear. 
However, when the distracter is an arrow, it causes interference regardless of the type 
of target. In terms of CPPR levels, the distracter causes interference when the CPPR 
level of the target is higher than that of the distracter, as in the WA task where the 
CPPR level of the target, thought processing, is higher than the perceptual processing 
required by the distractor. When the CPPR level of the target is lower than that of 
distracter, there is no interference, as in the AW task where the perceptual processing 
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required by the target is lower than the thought processing of the distracter. Finally, 
when CPPR levels of the target and distracter are equal, interference takes place when 
both require perceptual processing, as in the AA task, but not if both require thought 
processing, as in the WW task.  
According to the ERP waveforms and statistical results, the N2 amplitude 
difference in the AA task was not significant and a distinct waveform difference was 
apparent after the N2, with a peak at about 330 ms. Some previous studies have found 
that N2 amplitude modulation reflects conflict and control17,37, but others have found 
the modulation was not significant5,19,38. The contradiction may stem from differences 
in task requirements: amplitude modulation of the N2 is often associated with conflict 
between internal expectations and newly input information.  
The source analysis of the difference wave showed that the PFC was mainly 
activated in the early stage of conflict (270-300 ms), and it is reasonable to infer that 
brain activation in the early stage may reflect monitoring of conflict occurrence10. 
Therefore, the results in the present study support the viewpoint that PFC activation 
reflects conflict occurrence2-5. It is worth noting that in experimental tasks that 
support the monitoring role of the PFC in conflict, conflict is between two kinds of 
newly input information. Subsequently, brain activation in middle and late stages of 
conflict may reflect conflict control, and we have found sources mainly in the ACC 
and SPC. As the SPC is associated with the orienting response1,39, conflict control in 
the AA task would be expected to mainly relate to ACC activation. In fact, there are 
many studies where ACC activation has been found to be associated with conflict 
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control in motor responses2,18,23,40. In addition, the difference wave returned to 
baseline at about the time of the P3 peak, which may indicate that higher cognitive 
processes, such as working memory41 and stimulus evaluation42 were not involved in 
conflict control in the AA task.  
Similar to the AA task, in the WA task, the N2 amplitude difference between 
the incongruent and congruent conditions was also not significant. What differentiated 
the WA task, however, was that the initial point of the distinct difference was delayed 
to the time window from 340 to 410 ms, and the peak of the difference waveform was 
at about 370 ms. This difference may result from the difference in CPPR levels: 
thought vs. perception in the WA task, but perception vs. perception in the AA task. 
Although the speed of perceiving the arrow is faster, the corresponding response can 
not be executed immediately after perceiving the arrow because it is not the target. 
The correct response could not be made until the participant completed the semantic 
or phonetic processing of the word. The direction indicated by the arrow then 
remained in the representation before the response was finally executed according to 
the word meaning3,43. Because the processes that the word triggers are completed in 
working memory, conflict would take place in the representation. The source analysis 
results showed that both conflict occurrence and conflict control were mainly 
associated with the PFC in the WA task. Because the PFC plays an important role in 
conflict control involving the representation, such as internal intentions44, these results 
suggest that conflict occurrence and control in the WA task are closely related to 
representation. This inference is further supported by the proximity of the difference 
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wave peak and the P3 peak.  
There was no significant interference effect in either the AW or WW tasks. 
However, compared with the AW task, the behavioral RTs and latencies of the N2 
and P3 in the WW task were longer, suggesting differences in the effect of CPPR 
manipulation on these two tasks and the underlying cognitive processes. In the AW 
task, the CPPR in response to the target is perception, which is faster than the thought 
processing required by the distracter; the correct response has been executed before 
the opposing response is elicited by the distracter45. In the WW task, the CPPR in 
response to the target is the same as that in response to the distracter, and processes at 
the level of thought processing can be affected by internal intentions25,26, i.e., 
processing of the distracter word would be terminated consciously by the intentions to 
execute the response to the target, resulting in preemptive control46. 
 
How and in what time course is the ACC or PFC responsible for monitoring 
conflict occurrence? 
The results of the present study suggest that the PFC is responsible for 
monitoring conflict occurrence. We noted that, in the present tasks, the number of 
incongruent and congruent trials was equal, and the presentation of both types of trials 
was random. Therefore, participants could not form specific expectations regarding 
the stimuli in advance. Interestingly, this situation seems to be a common feature in 
previous studies that have found that the PFC is responsible for monitoring conflict 
occurrence. In contrast, when participants can form specific expectations regarding 
the forthcoming stimulus, the corresponding results often show that the ACC is 
responsible for monitoring conflict.  
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In studies that support the monitoring role of the ACC, participants were 
unequivocally asked or unintentionally induced to form specific expectations of the 
forthcoming stimulus. Some studies directly provided instructions telling participants 
which dimension of the Stroop color word should be attended8. Similarly, some 
studies allowed participants to form expectations of a feature in a specific dimension 
before the stimulus was presented in partially incongruent categorization task37. In 
other studies, the percentage of incongruent trials was significantly higher or lower 
than that of congruent trials7,17,47,48. Because of learning or induction49, especially in 
late stages of the experiment, participants can often predict the next stimulus based 
on earlier experience. When the effect of the preceding trial on the current trial was 
analyzed6,9, the results showed that the role of the ACC in monitoring conflict was 
related to expectation from the preceding trial. 
In studies that support the monitoring role of the PFC, participants can not 
form clear expectations regarding forthcoming stimuli. Incongruent and congruent 
stimuli are often presented in equal frequencies and the two kinds of stimuli are 
presented randomly, without advance instruction2-5, 23. Two studies of patients with 
PFC damage found no activation in the intact ACC4,43, suggesting that the PFC is 
involved in the evaluation of inputs23.  
A previous ERP dipole analysis showed that ACC activation followed 
activation of the PFC5. These results support the viewpoint that the PFC plays a 
monitoring role and the ACC exerts control3. Generally, in ERP studies with 
expectation, ACC activation and related N2 amplitudes differ significantly between 
congruent and incongruent conditions17,37. In contrast, without expectation, N2 
amplitudes show no significant difference5,38. These results further suggest that 
expectation causes conflict to appear earlier; and when there is no expectation, more 
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cognitive processes, such as newly input information being transformed into 
representation, are needed before conflict is detected.   
How and in what time course is the ACC or PFC recruited in conflict control? 
Previous studies have shown that the ACC is associated with solving 
response conflict, such as motor selection2,18,23,40. Specifically, the dorsal ACC, below 
the supplementary motor area, is thought to be related to manual response23. In the 
present AA task, conflict is associated with left and right button presses, and conflict 
resolution mainly involved the dorsal ACC, the source location of the peak difference. 
The familiar symbol-response connection pathway is generally independent of the 
PFC44, which implies that this kind of control involved little higher cognitive 
processing, such as intention or thought. In fact, in our AA task, the CPPR comparison 
is perception vs. perception, where the conflict is on a lower level of cognitive 
processing. The role of the ACC may be that of control of a concrete action in 
response to conflict46. It may be involved in selectively enhancing the activation of 
the correct response until a selection threshold is exceeded2; this kind of control is 
mainly automatic processing involving little conscious attention15. 
When conflict takes place in higher cognitive processing, such as 
representation, conflict resolution would activate the PFC44,50. For example, 
non-response conflict is closely associated with PFC activation13,16. Consistent with 
previous studies, in the present WA task, conflict control was mainly completed by the 
PFC, for here the CPPR comparison is thought vs. perception. The conflict is between 
the response representations, and the corresponding control elicits PFC activation. 
Because the processing in representation is subject to be affected by attention and 
intention25,26, the control is at a more strategic level. For example, it may increase 
attention to task-relevant information46, or bias attention to task-relevant 
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representation44,50. This strategic control is closely associated with PFC activation20,40. 
 
Conclusion 
Cognitive control consists of at least two processes, conflict monitoring and 
conflict control, and the involved neural mechanisms are different from each other. 
According to the our findings and the literature, in situations when specific 
expectations are formed before the stimulus is presented, the ACC is usually involved 
in monitoring the occurrence of conflict. When participants have no expectations, the 
PFC is usually activated. If conflict primarily involves motor selection, the main 
neural anatomic structure for implementing control is the ACC. However, if conflict is 
mainly at the representation stage, the PFC is the main structure for conflict control. 
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Figure Legends 
Figure 1. Examples of the stimuli used in the arrow and word tasks. 
 
Figure 2. The behavioral findings in the present four tasks. Mean response times for 
the congruent and incongruent conditions are shown in left graph for each task. Mean 
error rates are shown in right graph, where the standard error is indicated in the error 
bar.  
 
Figure 3. The grand waves and difference waves for the AA task (left) and WA task 
(right) at FCz. In both tasks, the red line is the incongruent condition, the blue line is 
the congruent condition, and the black line is the difference wave. The topographies 
of the difference waves at representative time points are presented on the bottom of 
their respective graphs. The topographical scales for both tasks are the same. 
 
Figure 4. The grand waves for the AW task (top row) and WW task (bottom row). For 
both tasks, the thick black line is the incongruent condition, and the thick gray line is 
the congruent condition. 
 
Figure 5. The distributed plots of p-values of single-sample t-tests for the amplitudes 
of the difference waves of the AA and WA tasks against zero at each sampled point for 
all participants (left plot is AA and right plot is WA ). The time range on the X-axis is 
from 0 to 500 ms post-stimulus. All selected electrodes are presented on the Y-axis, 
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and are aligned as left, middle, and right brain areas, and the left and right electrodes 
are symmetrical. The statistical significance levels have been further divided into 
three categories: significant (0.01 ≤ p < 0.05), more significant (0.001 ≤ p < 0.01), and 
very significant (p < 0.001), so as to present a detailed temporal and spatial 
distribution of the difference. 
 
Figure 6. Cortical current density maps of the AA and WA difference waves.  
 
Figure 7. Anatomical (sLORETA) modeling of cortical regions of difference waves. 
The time points are 330 ms in AA and 370 ms in WA. The active areas (z > 3.09, p < 
0.001) are illustrated on normalized Talairach slices. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Behavioral statistical results. 
 Task Congruent Incongruent t p 
AA 393±10.1 ms 410±11.9 ms t(15)=7.39 p<0.001** 
AW 383±8.6 ms 384±9.3 ms t(15)=0.584 p=0.568 
WA 465±10.1 ms 491±10.8 ms t(15)=7.129 p<0.001** 
Response 
Time 
WW 461±11.4 ms 468±12.1 ms t(15)=1.843 p=0.451 
AA 0.45±0.183 0.95±0.375 t(15)= 2.784 p=0.017* 
AW 0.47±0.195 0.56±0.33 t(15)= 0.364 p=0.721 
WA 1.32±0.444 3.23±0.948 t(15)= 2.762 p=0.015* 
Error Rate 
WW 2.08±0.757 2.28±0.493 t(15)= 1.3 p=0.213 
 
 
 
Table 2. Analyzed time points, Talairach coordinates, and activated areas of conflict 
and control in the AA and WA tasks. 
AA WA 
Time-points 
(ms) 
Talairach 
x, y, z (mm) 
Brain 
area 
Time-points 
(ms) 
Talairach 
x, y, z (mm) 
Brain 
area 
270 
50, 10, 40 
-6, -20, 64 
LPFC 
mPFC 
340 14, 16, 48 mPFC 
290 -2, -10, 56 mPFC 350 10, 12, 46 mPFC 
310 -2, -2, 54 mPFC 360 
32, 28, 44 
38, -56, 56 
LPFC 
SPC 
330 -2, -4, 44 dACC 370 
32, 28, 46 
38, -56, 54 
LPFC 
SPC 
350 
-4, 20, 44 
38, -60, 52 
dACC 
SPC 
380 
36, 26, 44 
42, -58, 52 
LPFC 
SPC 
370 
4, 18, 40 
42, -68, 48 
ACC 
SPC 
390 36, 24, 44 LPFC 
Note: dACC is dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, mPFC is medial prefrontal cortex, 
LPFC is lateral prefrontal cortex, SPC is superior parietal cortex. 
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